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Slum clearance and rebuilding first became a serious political project in Toronto
during the 1930s. Following the release of a systematic housing survey known as
the Bruce Report (1934), a set of actors distinguished by their planning authority
with respect to social agencies, influence over social work education, coordination
of social research, and role as spokespersons of religious bodies inaugurated a pol-
itical struggle over state power. While the campaign failed, it called forth a reaction
from established authorities and reconfigured the local political field as it related to
low-income housing. This article gives an account of these processes by drawing
upon correspondence and minutes of meetings of city officials and the campaign’s
organizers, newspaper clippings, and published materials.
L’e´limination des taudis et la reconstruction furent pour la premie`re fois un projet
politique se´rieux a` Toronto dans les anne´es 1930. Apre`s la diffusion des re´sultats
d’une enqueˆte syste´matique sur les logements connue sous le nom de rapport
Bruce (1934), un ensemble d’acteurs se de´marquant par leur pouvoir de planifica-
tion des organismes sociaux, leur influence sur la formation en travail social, leur
coordination de la recherche sociale et leur roˆle de porte-parole des organismes reli-
gieux s’affronte`rent sur la question du pouvoir de l’E´tat. Bien qu’elle fut un e´chec, la
campagne fit re´agir les autorite´s en place et modifia l’e´chiquier politique local dans
le domaine des logements pour personnes a` faible revenu. Cet article relate ces pro-
cessus en puisant pour ce faire dans la correspondance et les proce`s-verbaux des
re´unions des fonctionnaires municipaux et des organisateurs de la campagne ainsi
que dans les coupures de journal et les e´crits publie´s.
DURING THE GREAT Depression, the issue of public housing moved
from being a political project with little legitimacy in Canada to one
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supported nominally by federal housing legislation. Those who favoured
government involvement could appeal to a half-century-long history of
state programmes in England and, after 1933 and more importantly the
passage of the Wagner-Steagall Housing Act of 1937, the inclusion of
public housing as a component of the New Deal programmes in the
United States. Each of these national interventions involved a struggle
over the representation of the housing of low-income residents and a com-
petition to gain control over the new state powers that would be deployed.1
During the Depression, groups mobilized to demonstrate the existence
of unacceptable housing conditions among the lower classes in Canadian
cities such as Montreal, Toronto, Winnipeg, Halifax, and Vancouver. In
each of these cities housing surveys were conducted and used as a resource
in political campaigns for state action to improve conditions.2 Historical
accounts isolate the Report of the Lieutenant-Governor’s Committee on
Housing Conditions in Toronto (1934) from among studies of the period
before the Second World War on the basis of the quality of its empirical
research and the case it made for slum clearance and publicly owned
and subsidized housing.3 A set of actors, distinguished by their planning
authority with respect to social agencies, influence over social work edu-
cation, coordination of social research, and roles as spokespersons of reli-
gious bodies, used the Bruce Report to inaugurate a political struggle over
state power. Although the group lost its coherence as its attempt to enact
political representation failed, the struggle it initiated called forth a reac-
tion from established authorities and gave shape to a sub-field of struggle
over state powers relating to housing.
1 John Bacher, “One Unit Was Too Many: The Failure to Develop a Canadian Social Housing Policy in
the Great Depression,” Journal of Canadian Studies, vol. 22, no. 3 (1987), pp. 50–61. On the
American pattern, see Gwendolyn Wright, Building the Dream: A Social History of Housing in
America (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981); Gail Radford, “The Federal Government and
Housing During the Great Depression” in John F. Bauman, Roger Biles, and Kristin M. Szylvian,
eds., From Tenements to Taylor Homes: In Search of an Urban Housing Policy in Twentieth-Century
America (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), pp. 102–120; Alexander
von Hoffman, “The End of the Dream: The Political Struggle of America’s Public Housers”,
Journal of Planning History, vol. 4, no. 3 (August 2005), pp. 222–253. On the British experience,
see Anthony S. Wohl, The Eternal Slum: Housing and Social Policy in Victorian London (London:
Edward Arnold, 1977); J. A. Yelling, Slums and Redevelopment: Policy and Practice in England,
1918–45 (London: University College London Press, 1992). See also Stefan Epp, “Class,
Capitalism, and Construction: Winnipeg’s Housing Crisis and the Debate over Public Housing,
1934–1939,” Histoire sociale – Social History, vol. 43, no. 86 (November 2010), pp. 393–428.
2 John Bacher, Keeping to the Marketplace: The Evolution of Canadian Housing Policy (Montreal and
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993), pp. 66–74.
3 References to the Bruce Report can be found in local histories of Toronto and as part of narratives of
housing policy development. Memoirs of those who were involved with the report and the Housing
Centre are suggestive and include Herbert A. Bruce, Varied Operations: An Autobiography
(Toronto: Longmans, Green, 1958), pp. 241–247; Humphrey Carver, Compassionate Landscape
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), pp. 51–57.
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The argument made here draws upon the work of the late French soci-
ologist Pierre Bourdieu. Through empirical application, Bourdieu devel-
oped a system of concepts that aims to represent the relational aspect of
social existence. His concept of a field situates actors invested in a particu-
lar struggle on the basis of the distribution of different forms of power or
capital. He identifies four forms of capital or power: symbolic, which
derives from the authority of actors’ representations; social, arising from
social networks; economic; and cultural, which is linked to institutional
legitimacy. Fields represent the relatively autonomous microcosms of a dif-
ferentiated social space that characterizes modern societies. In each field
there is a struggle for the symbolic profits that accrue to those who are
able to claim authority and orient the related social activities. The field’s
objective structure is supported by and reproduced through the embodied
dispositions that guide the actors invested in it. These coordinated disposi-
tions of the actors in a field are what Bourdieu called habitus. The concepts
of habitus, field, and capital are interdependent elements of Bourdieu’s
analysis of social organization.4
Fields are not static, but are susceptible to change through their repro-
duction. They possess an inherent instability arising from the unequal dis-
tribution of capital and the social trajectories of actors. A new group may
attempt to upset the dominance of those who monopolize a field’s specific
power by gaining recognition as legitimate players in the game. An
attempt to convert the capital specific to one field into power in another
will be subject to depreciation at a rate reflecting society-wide struggles.
Adjustments to particular fields often reflect wider changes in society.5
The virtue of this set of concepts lies in the imperative to combine a
structural analysis of the distribution of power with an examination of
the struggles through which specific power is conferred in a particular
microcosm. To delineate a field, a historian or sociologist must identify
the particular forms of capital that matter in the struggle under investi-
gation: “a species of capital is what is efficacious in a given field, both as
a weapon and as a stake of struggle, that which allows its possessors
to wield a power, an influence, and thus to exist, in the field under
4 For a general introduction to Bourdieu’s work, see Pierre Bourdieu and Loic J. D. Wacquant, An
Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992). For the critical place of
practices in linking habitus, capital, and field, see Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, trans.
Richard Nice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990). Of his empirical studies, social historians
will find those focused on class lifestyles and the transformation of the field of French academics in
the late 1960s of particular interest. See, respectively, Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social
Critique of the Judgement of Taste, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1984), and Homo Academicus, trans. Peter Collier (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988).
5 Pierre Bourdieu, “Some Properties of Fields” in Sociology in Question, trans. Richard Nice (London:
Sage, 1993), pp. 72–74; Bourdieu and Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, pp. 76 n. 16,
979–978, 114.
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consideration, instead of being considered a negligible quantity.”6 The sig-
nificance of the positions of those in a struggle and the logic of that inter-
action are reciprocally determinative. Constructing a field requires, first,
that sources be read with a sensitivity for the considerations deemed by
actors to make it important to struggle over, and secondly, that those dif-
ferentiating efforts be brought into relation with the distribution of
hypothesized “pertinent properties” (forms of capital) among the set of
actors who appear to matter.7
The Bruce Report and the related slum clearance campaign were part
of a struggle for power over a particular corner of the municipal state.
While the extension of the powers of the municipal state was at stake,
the struggle involved a dual problem of establishing a field in which
actors competed for control of those powers.8 The struggle took shape
through the intervention of a set of social welfare leaders
(E. J. Urwick, H. P. and Adelaide Plumptre, Claris Silcox, and Maurice
Eisendrath), distinguished by particular cultural markers of authority
they derived from their involvement in social agencies, the discipline of
social work, and churches, from their symbolic capital as spokespersons
for the interests of low-income families, and from their influential associ-
ations with the city’s philanthropically involved business and professional
elite. They were able to mobilize volunteers, gain access to investigate the
houses of low-income residents, have a particular representation of the
problem accepted by a broad range of actors, and deploy their networks
for political influence. The struggle failed to establish the envisioned
state projects but initialized a new sub-field of power relative to the
municipal state.
I briefly sketch the fields of housing regulation and land-use planning
that took shape in the early twentieth century, then present the changes
in the patterns of housing use during the Depression and summarize the
Bruce Report’s findings. I argue that the representation of “bad
housing” in the report drew upon practical schemes that organized the
social welfare field socially and spatially. The work of the Bruce
Committee gave rise to political organizing, group rivalries, and challenges
to existing authorities. The struggle revolved around several particular
sites — two municipal committees and the 1937 plebiscite concerning
a slum clearance proposal — and led to institutional adjustments
that helped to organize a setting for further disputes over low-income
housing.
6 Bourdieu and Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, pp. 97–99.
7 Bourdieu, Homo Academicus, p. 9.
8 Pierre Bourdieu, “Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field,” trans. Loic
Wacquant and Samar Farage, in Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1998), p. 42.
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Housing, Planning, and State Power before the Depression
The campaign for improvement in low-income housing during the 1930s,
led by social welfare interests, encountered the institutional and symbolic
authority of public health and town planning that had accrued over the
1910s and 1920s. This influence and the existing housing pattern had
taken root in the period following the city’s rapid industrialization in the
late nineteenth century.
During the last three decades of the nineteenth century, the poorest
segment of Toronto’s population became concentrated in small, densely
clustered houses near the city centre, close to factories, packing houses,
and railyards in the east or west. Housing for these classes of labour was
reported to be affordable only when unsanitary and overcrowded.
Construction of small cottages or conversion of houses given up after pro-
longed use by the higher classes were the main means of adding to the
stock at the lower end of the market in this period. One outlet for
higher grades of workers with stable employment from the 1890s to
around the First World War was to build their own homes on land
outside the city boundaries.9
A political atmosphere of uncertainty developed from the rapid social
change associated with industrialization and increased immigration from
non-Anglo-Saxon countries. The cultural differences of immigrants and
their concentration in low-rent, inner-city districts attracted journalists,
Christian missionaries, and organized reform groups such as the Local
Council of Women, who placed the housing question on the public
agenda.10 Slums were implicated sometimes as sources, other times as
expressions, of concern about race degeneration.11
New urban authorities began to scrutinize how low-income families
lived. The institutional expansion of public health in the 1910s reflected
the momentum it gained from alignment with social and moral reform
movements. The Province of Ontario established a Board of Health in
1883, but not until the second decade of the twentieth century did the
local board of health in Toronto expand its concerns beyond the control
of epidemic diseases. Public health officials intervened to reduce infant
9 J. M. S. Careless, Toronto to 1918: An Illustrated History (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1984), p. 138;
Michael Piva, The Condition of the Working Class in Toronto, 1900–1921 (Ottawa: University of
Ottawa Press, 1979), pp. 125–130; Richard Harris, Unplanned Suburbs: Toronto’s American
Tragedy (Baltimore, NJ: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 135–139, 157–158, 234–237.
10 D. C. Masters, The Rise of Toronto, 1850–1890 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1947),
pp. 126–127; Mrs. F. G. Huestis (President, Toronto LCW), “Women and Housing Reform,”
Housing Problems in America, Proceedings of the Third National Conference on Housing,
Cincinnati 1913 (Cambridge, MA: The University Press, 1913), vol. 3, pp. 258–259.
11 Angus McLaren, Our Own Master Race: Eugenics in Canada, 1885–1945 (Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 1990), pp. 15, 24, 27–29, 36–37, 46–48, 63, 113.
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and maternal mortality using school health inspections and home visits, as
well as campaigns against impure milk and for improved sanitation.12
These officials investigated, made recommendations, and implemented
new standards in relation to low-income housing. Toronto’s Medical
Health Officer Charles Hastings used the term “slum” in 1911 to refer
to “poor, unsanitary houses, overcrowded, insufficiently lighted, badly ven-
tilated, with unsanitary, and in many cases, filthy yards.”13 Hastings traced
these conditions to the exploitative practices of landlords, inadequate spe-
cification of responsibilities and enforcement (as concerned lodging and
sub-tenancy), and “national” differences in domestic sanitary standards.
The inclusion in public health reports of “social aspects” pertaining to
morals and delinquency mirrored the organizational alliance that the
department had developed with the missions and settlements situated in
inner-city neighbourhoods of Toronto.14 Public health officials were
empowered in their inspections by new standards of sanitary conveniences
(1913) and overcrowding (1912 and 1916).15 Other aspects of a loosely
coherent reformist strategy in this period included the provision of edu-
cation in hygiene, model housing projects, and, in a more ideal way,
town planning.16
In contrast to the regulatory and educational approach of public health,
architects and engineers attempting to establish a professional field of
town planning in the early twentieth century relied upon preventative
diagnoses to gain influence in housing discussions. Town planners
lobbied the provinces throughout the First World War and the interwar
period for planning legislation. Ontario’s 1917 Planning and
12 Piva, The Condition of the Working Class, pp. 113, 115; Richard Allen, The Social Passion: Religion
and Social Reform in Canada, 1914–28 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), p. 21; McLaren,
Our Own Master Race, pp. 36–37.
13 Charles J. Hastings, Report of the Medical Officer Dealing with the Recent Investigation of Slum
Conditions in Toronto (Toronto: Department of Health, 1911), p. 3.
14 Ibid., pp. 4, 8, 10, 18, 20, 23–25; Allen, The Social Passion, p. 21; Ethel (Dodds) Parker, “The Origins
and Early History of the Presbyterian Settlement Houses” in Richard Allen, ed., Interdisciplinary
Conference on the Social Gospel in Canada, University of Regina, 1973 (Ottawa: National
Museums of Canada, 1975), p. 102; Sara Z. Burke, Seeking the Highest Good: Social Service and
Gender at the University of Toronto, 1888–1937 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996),
pp. 63, 67; F. N. Stapleford, After Twenty Years: A Short History of the Neighborhood Workers
Association (Toronto: Neighborhood Workers’ Association, 1938), pp. 8, 13.
15 Huestis “Women and Housing Reform,” vol. 3, pp. 258–259; Harris, Unplanned Suburbs, pp. 151–
152; Shirley Spragge, “A Confluence of Interests: Housing Reform in Toronto, 1900–1920” in Alan
F. J. Artibise and Gilbert A. Stelter, eds., The Usable Urban Past: Planning and Politics in the Modern
Canadian City (Toronto: Macmillan, 1979), p. 251.
16 Spragge, “A Confluence of Interests,” pp. 253–254; Lorna Fay Hurl, “The Toronto Housing
Company, 1912–1923: The Pitfalls of Painless Philanthropy,” Canadian Historical Review, vol. 65,
no.1 (1984), pp. 34, 37–38; Paul Adolphus Bator, “The Struggle to Raise the Lower Classes:
Public Health Reform and the Problem of Poverty in Toronto, 1910–1921,” Journal of Canadian
Studies, vol. 14, no. 1 (1979), pp. 44–45; Hastings, Report of the Medical Officer, pp. 28–32.
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Development Act favoured adaptive land use planning and failed to
provide the powers to promote decentralization and regulated suburban
development advocated by planners.17
The professional horizons and hopes of many municipal planners
working for older cities like Toronto contrasted with the work they per-
formed. Their “managerial” activity involved the protection of property
values and the extension and widening of streets to adjust to new patterns
of use. It did not extend to the preparation of the long-range city plans that
they periodically recommended. The “management” approach was
regarded as being responsive to shifting lines of land use, forming the
basis for efficient development and servicing and for sound tax policy.18
Planners became prominent spokespersons on housing issues during the
1920s. The influence of town planners rose as social workers and clergy
withdrew from organized advocacy, particularly through the social
survey movement. The Social Service Council of Canada turned to engin-
eer A. G. Dalzell for research and publications on housing during much of
the 1920s.19 Social agencies remained a privileged source of information on
housing conditions in the interwar period, however. The Toronto Local
Council of Women was critical of the elimination of housing discussions
from meetings of social agencies during the 1920s, and it worked to
organize the gathering of information on housing conditions. Among
social welfare workers themselves, the opportunity for renewed advocacy
in debates over housing was clearly perceived on the eve of the
Depression.20
17 John David Hulchanski, “The Origins of Urban Land Use Planning in Ontario, 1900–1946” (PhD
dissertation, University of Toronto, 1981), pp. 34–44, 76–77, 104–105, 123–126; Thomas
I. Gunton, “The Ideas and Policies of the Canadian Planning Profession, 1909–1931” in Artibise
and Stelter, eds., The Usable Urban Past, pp. 183–184, 188.
18 Michael Simpson, Thomas Adams and the Modern Planning Movement: Britain, Canada, and the
United States, 1900–1940 (London: Mansell, 1985), pp. 75–77; Gunton, “The Ideas and Policies of
the Canadian Planning Profession,” pp. 181–182; Hulchanski, “The Origins of Urban Land Use
Planning,” pp. 31, 164–174, 179, 194–195; Walter Van Nus, “Towards the City Efficient: The
Theory and Practice of Zoning, 1919–1939” in Artibise and Stelter, eds., The Usable Urban Past,
pp. 226–238; Peter W. Moore, “Zoning and Planning: The Toronto Experience, 1904–1970” in
Artibise and Stelter, eds., The Usable Urban Past, pp. 325–326.
19 Alan Hunt, “Measuring Morals: The Beginnings of the Social Survey Movement in Canada, 1913–
1917,” Histoire sociale – Social History, vol. 35, no. 69 (May 2002), pp. 173, 180, 183; P. T. Rooke and
R. L. Schnell, No Bleeding Heart: Charlotte Whitton, a Feminist on the Right (Vancouver: University
of British Columbia Press, 1987), p. 20; Nancy Christie and Michael Gauvreau, A Full-Orbed
Christianity: The Protestant Churches and Social Welfare in Canada, 1900–1940 (Montreal and
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996); Housing in Halifax (Halifax, 1932), p. 8. See
Social Welfare, November 1, 1920.
20 Archives of Ontario, Council of Women Collection, F805, vol. 5, file 1, Toronto Local Council of
Women – In affiliation with the National Council of Women of Canada – Thirty-Second Annual
Report, 1925 and Yearbook, 1932; William McCloy, “The Social Worker’s Attitude toward
Housing,” Social Welfare (1929), pp. 178–180.
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The Depression and the Bruce Report
The Depression in Toronto was signalled by a variety of institutional
measures. Statistically, recorded unemployment in the city had risen to
17 per cent by the time of the 1931 census and reached 30 per cent by
January 1933. A quarter of those working in manufacturing in 1929
were out of work by 1933, and those who retained employment experi-
enced a drop in wages that historians have shown outstripped the
decline in living costs (particularly in rent). Construction workers were
hit especially hard, as the industry halted for much of the decade.21
Social service workers were well positioned to witness the severity and
consequences of mass unemployment and reduced income among
workers. Some were involved with the provision of relief to recipients,
who numbered 200,000 at mid-decade in greater Toronto. The strict deli-
neation of those eligible for relief excluded single men, “transients,”
most women, and the recently arrived or “unnaturalized foreigners,” and
the inadequacy of rates left a considerable domain for voluntary
organizations.22
Social service workers also recognized many of the changes in housing
conditions among low-income families. Families took in boarders or
doubled up, and young adults delayed leaving home. Some owners con-
verted their homes into several apartments, while others relocated from
the suburbs to the inner city where houses were larger and more amenable
to division. Boarders in private dwellings most often joined the families of
skilled blue-collar workers, who could adjust their use of the dwelling
space to have rooms to rent and who valued the income over the loss of
privacy. While estimates suggest that in the early 1930s over 25 per cent
of unskilled workers and 45 per cent of skilled blue-collar workers
owned homes, there was a shift from owner-occupation to renting over
the decade. Many comparatively costly dwellings sat vacant for a time.23
In the context of this acute and sustained loss of work and unprece-
dented number of claims for relief, Lieutenant-Governor of Ontario
Herbert Bruce (1868–1963) used the occasion of Toronto’s centenary
(1934) to declare that many in Toronto lived in slums and that its citizens
21 James Lemon, Toronto since 1918: An Illustrated History (Toronto: Lorimer, 2002), pp. 59–60.
22 Roger E. Riendeau, “A Clash of Interests: Dependency and the Municipal Problem in the Great
Depression,” Journal of Canadian Studies, vol. 14, no. 1 (Spring 1979), p. 54; Lemon, Toronto
since 1918, p. 60; Stapleford, After Twenty Years, pp. 21–22; Katrina Srigley, Breadwinning
Daughters: Single Working Women in a Depression-era City, 1929–1939 (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2002).
23 Harris, Unplanned Suburbs, pp. 250–251, 253; Richard Harris, “The Ends Justified the Means:
Boarding and Rooming in a City of Homes, 1890–1951,” Journal of Social History, vol. 26, no. 2
(1992), pp. 342–343; Daniel Hiebert, “The Social Geography of Toronto in 1931: A Study of
Residential Differentiation and Social Structure,” Journal of Historical Geography, vol. 21, no. 1
(1995), p. 62; Lemon, Toronto since 1918, pp. 65, 67.
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and politicians must bear responsibility for the existence and elimination
of such poor dwellings. Mayor Stewart immediately responded that tax-
payers were regrettably incapable of financing slum clearance and re-
housing. He nevertheless offered to pressure the provincial government
for changes to the Municipal Act that would encourage private initiative
and proposed an independent investigation of the situation. The product
of this investigation was the Bruce Report.24
The membership of the Bruce Committee was set through negotiations
between Mayor Stewart and Lieutenant-Governor Bruce. The mayor
offered to appoint a committee under Bruce’s direction and “composed
of men and women who, over a long period of time, have demonstrated
by their constructive efforts in social conditions, that they are interested
in our city. I would ask them . . . to study and report in an advisory
capacity.”25 Individuals were nominated and then narrowed down to a
list that, apart from those who excused themselves, was adopted.26 The
committee’s executive included Bruce as honorary chairman, Professor
E. J. Urwick and Professor H. M. Cassidy of the Department of Social
Science at the University of Toronto as vice-chairman and secretary, and
J. J. Gibson (chairman of the Council for Community Service) as treasurer.
The inner circle was completed by Professor H. Wasteneys (vice-chairman
of the Board of Directors of the University Settlement), Mrs. H. P.
(Adelaide) Plumptre (of the Board of Education and soon to be council-
lor), and Miss Helen Spence, who acted as the assistant secretary. The
committee included representatives of the Board of Trade, the
Federation for Community Service, the Labour Council, the Toronto
Local Council of Women, and Toronto women’s councils of national pol-
itical parties.27 Notably, the committee included no members with expertise
in housing development or land use planning.
The Bruce Report adopted a locally realistic use of the term “slum.” It
designated areas or districts with scattered pockets of “slum life,” which
could be distinguished using two standards of fitness, one for health and
another for amenities. To pass the health standard, dwellings had to be
24 Riendeau, “A Clash of Interests,” p. 52; The Globe, March 7, 1934. Herbert Alexander Bruce (1868–
1963) had studied at the Toronto School of Medicine and received the degree of MD in 1893. He
then worked as a surgeon at Toronto General Hospital and in the Faculty of Medicine at the
University of Toronto. During the First World War he led a study of the Canadian Army Medical
Services in England. During the interwar years he acted as director of Wellesley Hospital, which
he had founded. Bennett appointed him Lieutenant-Governor on October 25, 1932, at a time
when there was growing opposition to the position. Bruce resigned on November 16, 1937, and
was elected to Parliament the following year in the Toronto riding of Parkdale. See Bruce, Varied
Operations.
25 Bruce, Varied Operations, p. 243.
26 Report of the Lieutenant-Governor’s Committee on Housing Conditions in Toronto [hereafter Bruce
Report] (Toronto: Toronto Board of Control, 1934), pp. 2, 3, 6.
27 Bruce Report, pp. 3, 6.
The Bruce Report and Social Welfare Leadership 91
free from dampness, the elements, and pests and to have circulating light
and air, as well as facilities for cooking and cleaning, and sanitary
devices that included a sink with tap and drain, a bath or basin, and a
water closet that could be reached from within the house. The amenities
standard required that a dwelling possess central heating, a cement
cellar, artificial light in all rooms, full indoor plumbing, and cooking facili-
ties separate from other domestic spaces. Those dwellings that violated the
standard of health were “not to be tolerated as homes for any families in a
community that cares for the welfare of all its citizens.” Failing to meet the
second standard meant that, “while not in the same sense intolerable, [the
dwelling] cannot be viewed with equanimity and should be changed as
soon as possible.”28
The main research component of the report not only evaluated particu-
lar dwellings, but mapped slum areas. Two separate surveys were under-
taken. The first “extensive” one used information provided by social
agencies, organizations, and individuals and attempted to locate the
worst housing areas of Toronto and to suggest the scale and character of
the problem for the whole city. On the basis of this investigation, a
second “intensive” survey was carried out that recorded the general
environmental context and the condition of all residences in two districts,
Moss Park (Cabbagetown) and the Ward.29 In the case of Cabbagetown,
the residents were mostly English and Scottish first- or second-generation
workers, with a section of Irish and Macedonians. The scrutinized popu-
lation of the Ward appears to have been largely of Eastern European
background.30
The surveys revealed the overwhelming extent of substandard housing
and presented evidence of comparatively elevated neighbourhood rates
of disease, mortality, delinquency, criminality, and family dysfunction.
Seventy-five per cent of the extensive survey’s 1,332 dwellings were
assessed as below the standard of health, while 96 per cent were
deemed below the amenities standard. The intensive survey of entire
blocks revealed that 40 per cent of the Moss Park sample of 3,047 dwell-
ings lay below the health standard and 73 per cent below the amenities
standard, while in the Ward’s sample of 592, the percentages were 58
and 79 per cent respectively. Extrapolations from the surveys led to the
estimate that between 2,000 and 3,000 houses in Toronto were below the
health standard.31
28 Ibid., pp. 13–15.
29 Ibid., pp. 7–8, 13, 15, 23, 136.
30 Hugh Garner, “Toronto’s Cabbagetown,” Canadian Forum, vol. 16 (June 1936), pp. 13–15; Lillian
Petroff, Sojourners and Settlers: The Macedonian Community in Toronto to 1940 (Toronto:
Multicultural History Society of Ontario and the University of Toronto Press, 1995), pp. 13–21,
75–91; Hiebert, “The Social Geography of Toronto,” p. 63.
31 Bruce Report, pp. 18, 20, 24, 32–54.
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Once the report had factually and interpretively linked housing con-
ditions to health and social problems, it examined the origins of bad
housing and made recommendations for action. The report identified
the economic causes of slums as the inadequate income of renters and
the unmanageable costs to builders arising from speculation in real
estate, high rates of interest on credit, and inefficient civic control of
land development and planning of services. On the basis of a survey of
state action in Toronto and internationally, the report claimed that
public action in the form of planning and positive encouragement of con-
struction was necessary and that the re-housing of low-income individuals
should be made feasible through rent subsidies and public financing.32
The report also recommended the establishment of a unified authority
to undertake replanning and re-housing and presented three plans for
the redevelopment of portions of Moss Park. The report’s first recommen-
dation insisted on the establishment of a “City Planning Commission”
comprised of “competent, disinterested and independent citizens,”
meaning volunteers aided by experts. The second and third recommen-
dations concerned the immediate condemnation of unfit dwellings, the
initiation of slum clearance, and a project to provide low-cost housing.
The last recommendation insisted that the municipality should appeal to
other levels of government for assistance in this work.33
Construction of the “Slum” and the Organization of Social Welfare
The representation of low-income housing provided in the Bruce Report
was a product of the institutional capacities of the social welfare field.
The effect of this dependence was to link the question of slum conditions
to the practices of social agencies (such as casework and diagnosis), their
concentration of administrative authority in a federation and organization
at a neighbourhood level, and their concern for certain communities. The
Bruce Report undertook an extensive survey of households by relying
upon case files of “the principal social agencies of the city” and the sugges-
tions of other organizations. These agencies made a selection from their
pre-existing “cases” on the basis of dwelling conditions. This strategy
would have been oriented by their own sense of what elements were pro-
blematic for family life. The committee’s inspectors then applied the two
standards of categorization described above to these pooled data.34
Access was granted to dwellings on the basis of a client-service relation-
ship with a social agency. Thus, in the case of the University Settlement,
whose vice-chairman of the board was a member of the Bruce committee
(H. Wasteneys), the relationship meant that “[f ]or two weeks during the
32 Ibid., pp. 76–77, 93.
33 Ibid., pp. 96–103, 106–108, 115–121.
34 Ibid., p. 7.
The Bruce Report and Social Welfare Leadership 93
survey, Settlement families co-operated with the Housing Committee by
opening their homes for inspection.”35
The coordinated gathering of information from social agencies mir-
rored their organization in the Federation for Community Service. The
overlap between the federation and the Bruce Committee included
the chairman of the council of the FCS (J. J. Gibson), its president
(Thomas Bradshaw), and a member of its important social policy com-
mittee (Urwick).36 The capacity to draw upon the networks of social
agencies, their information-gathering activities, and their professional
posture toward families reflected not only the institutional organization
of social welfare but the particular position of a set of leaders in the
field.
Social Welfare and Family Life
Concern over family life was widespread from at least the turn of the
century in Canada’s large cities. The diversity of household arrangements
that arose in connection with unstable employment opportunities for low-
wage workers, many of whom were single and migratory, and the challenge
of obtaining affordable housing fuelled a perceived need to regulate the
family life of the lower classes. The observed and imagined arrangements
of boarding, apartment or multi-family dwellings, and women’s hostels
were represented as threatening to produce social deviants and encourage
the exploitation of children. They were the subject of lively calls for
reform. Discursive and social structures sustained the reformers’ ignorance
of the social norms that governed the relations of working-class and immi-
grant families “living otherwise.”37
The institution of the family emerged as the professional focus for social
workers in charitable organizations in the first few decades of the twenti-
eth century. While professionalization did not make substantial gains until
the interwar period in Toronto, the field increased in legitimacy by court-
ing a position as care-givers of families disrupted by impersonal economic
forces. Workers could appeal to their expertise in meeting the “personal
element” and aiding the development of “personal resources” in dealing
with both the needs created by unemployment and its “aftermath of
35 Hortense Catherine Fardell Wasteneys, “A History of the University Settlement of Toronto, 1910–
1958: An Exploration of the Social Objectives of the University Settlement and their
Implementation” (PhD dissertation, University of Toronto, 1975), p. 119 n. 3.
36 Gale Wills, A Marriage of Convenience: Business and Social Work in Toronto 1918–1957 (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1995), pp. 5, 34, 63–64; Bruce Report, p. 3.
37 Mariana Valverde, The Age of Light, Soap, and Water: Moral Reform in English Canada, 1885–1925
(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1991), pp. 96–99, 134–135; Harris, Unplanned Suburbs, pp. 92–95;
Richard Dennis, “Interpreting the Apartment House: Modernity and Metropolitanism in Toronto,
1900–1930,” Journal of Historical Geography, vol. 20, no. 3 (1994), p. 312; Pierre Bourdieu,
“Appendix: The Family Spirit,” trans. Richard Nice, in Practical Reason, p. 69.
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human wreckage.”38 The discourse of helping families and the practices
that gave the discourse its rationale are reflected in the logic of the
Bruce Report.
While the report related “bad housing” to concerns of public health
and municipal finance, the aspects it identified as particularly problematic
and the imperative to act cohered around perceptions of family life.39 The
“features of slums which are injurious to health and morality” were inter-
preted to operate on bodies directly through the loss of privacy and the
“breakdown of family life.”40 The physical arrangement of dwellings was
presented as exposing children and youth to more immediate (and
taken-for-granted) risks of sexual violation, arising from inadequate
segregation of the sexes in sleeping arrangements or from the potential
“nuisances” created by “dark halls and stairways.” The inadequacy of
physical features and domestic furnishings was seen to magnify the work
of sustaining a family and to impede significantly the care and surveillance
of children. Such disruptions of domestic life were read as contributing to
youth fraternizing in the streets and not infrequently becoming delinquent
or falling into a life of crime. The moral risks of uncomfortable and
overcrowded dwellings for children were seen to arise in part from their
displacement from the positive direction of adults and thus from
encouragement of formative tastes for respectable activities.41
Hence re-housing the population was understood to involve the chal-
lenge of altering both the durable physical environment and the patterns
of behaviour that disrupted family life. The committee and Urwick
himself appealed to social work experience to support the claim that the
majority of those re-housed would “appreciate and make good use of
the opportunities for a better, healthier, and more dignified life offered
by the reconstructed area.”42 Nevertheless, to encourage the care of prop-
erty and the greatest benefit for tenants, the report recommended Octavia
Hill’s method of administration. As part of her philanthropic project to
improve landlord practices in Victorian London by example, Hill had
38 Roy Lubove, The Professional Altruist: The Emergence of Social Work as a Career, 1880–1930
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 40–41, Kathleen Woodroofe, From Charity to
Social Work in England and the United States (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), pp. 33,
43–44, 50; Stapleford, After Twenty Years, pp. 6–7.
39 The Bruce Report was a collaborative project in both its research and writing stages. Distinct layers reflect
an early stage of writing done by Harry M. Cassidy and a later one by Bruce, Urwick, and the economist
Wynn Plumptre (son of H. P. and Adelaide). This difference is exemplified by Cassidy’s pragmatic
approach to statistical categorization and social explanation, as compared to Urwick’s concern for the
social significance of the “facts.” See Ryan George, “E. J. Urwick, the Lieutenant-Governor’s Report,
and the Housing Centre of Toronto, 1934–1938” (MA research paper, York University, 2005).
40 Bruce Report, p. 35.
41 Ibid., pp. 35, 36, 46, 47, 49–50.
42 Ibid., pp. 108–109; E. J. Urwick, “Housing and Social Work,” Proceedings of the Fifth Canadian
Conference on Social Work (Ottawa, June 1–3, 1937), p. 177.
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put into practice a housing management philosophy that involved a moral
reform agenda. At the height of her activity, she managed the dwellings of
more than 3,000 people with intermittent or small regular incomes, offer-
ing them a standard of housing otherwise completely out of their reach.43
The Bruce Report advised the appointment of managers who would be
competent “as social supervisors of the welfare of the particular commu-
nity, and also [act] as friends and advisors of the families comprising
it.”44 Slum clearance and public housing were to establish a new setting
in which the practices of social welfare could be applied. The religious
leaders among the social welfare leadership asserted similar hopes in
1936: “We believe, moreover, that the concentration of such homes of
the families which cannot afford to pay an economic rent, would facilitate
the more adequate and economical provision of those social services and
supervision which will be necessary for some time to improve and main-
tain the morale of some of the families forced at present to live in a
degraded and unhappy condition.”45
Leadership and the Social Welfare Field
Authority within the social welfare field was structured by its practical
regionalization of the inner city and an institutional division of labour.
Social welfare activity was decentralized in its practical organization, but
centralized in its control over planning and administration. These two
aspects bear upon the distribution of social, cultural, and economic
capital in the field. This structure enabled a social welfare leadership to
construct the slum problem in a distinctive way and mobilize groups in
support of its political intervention.
As professional social workers became active in Toronto after the First
World War, they mediated between their clients and a range of services in
the neighbourhood, creating a space of activity through their practices of
information exchange and referral. As in the United States, information
about community services (health, education, and employment, for
example) was to be integrated with knowledge of particular needs
through meeting in a “neighbourhood centre.” Reform projects com-
menced new processes of setting apart and internally regionalizing these
locales as neighbourhoods.46 The representation of inner-city
43 Wohl, The Eternal Slum, pp. 179–199.
44 Bruce Report, p. 109.
45 City of Toronto Archives [hereafter CTA], Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto [hereafter MMT],
220, S100, File 8, “Considerations to be Presented by Toronto Churchmen to the Board of Control,”
May 20, 1936.
46 James Pitsula, “The Emergence of Social Work in Toronto,” Journal of Canadian Studies, vol. 14,
no. 1 (1979), p. 40; Woodroofe, From Charity to Social Work, pp. 81–82; Anthony Giddens, The
Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984),
pp. 118–122.
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neighbourhoods as places where problems relating to personal life, liveli-
hood, and material existence intertwined was conditioned by the practices
of social welfare service toward particular populations. By contrast, the
suburban “slums” deplored by town planners fell outside the institutional
and practical capacities of social agencies to represent them.
From the turn of the twentieth century to the 1930s, the settlement
movement made an important contribution to the integration of social
welfare work and community life in Toronto. District associations took
root before the First World War, and following it they established decen-
tralization as a professional principle. These associations joined in the
spring of 1914 to form the Neighbourhood Workers’ Association
(NWA).47 The NWA district offices were professional networking sites,
and the district secretary performed the task of integrating and coordinat-
ing the efforts of voluntary organizations and social work agencies.
Clergymen were among the most important supporters of the NWA, and
the problems of the district and the organization of social work were pre-
sented to them through its district meetings. Professional social workers
gave direction to voluntary efforts through the mediation of such commu-
nity leaders. Thus, during the interwar period, the expansion of paid staff
did not displace volunteer activity, but instead organized it and encouraged
its expansion.48
As professional capacity became tied to neighbourhood work, the
administration of social agencies was reorganized through a compromise
with the coordinating objectives of city government as well as philanthro-
pic and business groups concerned with efficient administration. After
ineffectual efforts between the 1880s and the 1900s, the Social Services
Commission was established in 1912 as a watchdog over municipally
funded agencies. In 1918, the Federation for Community Service (FCS)
arose out of an attempt by social workers to obtain stable funding and
by financial contributors to impose business standards in administration.
The effect was to internalize the struggle between the practical objectives
of cost limitation and professional autonomy. The federation implemented
new practices of allocating funds among agencies on a community-wide
level, a process that came to be dominated by business community repre-
sentatives on the budgeting committee but with the mediation of influen-
tial social welfare leaders.49
The social welfare leaders involved in the housing campaign held varied
positions in social service planning, in organizing research and educational
47 Cathy James, “Reforming Reform: Toronto’s Settlement House Movement, 1900–1920,” Canadian
Historical Review, vol. 82, no. 1 (2001), pp. 73–74; Stapleford, After Twenty Years, pp. 7, 10, 13.
48 Stapleford, After Twenty Years, pp. 13–15, 19–20.
49 Wills, A Marriage of Convenience, pp. 5, 15, 34, 37, 39, 40, 44; Pitsula, “The Emergence of Social
Work,” pp. 37–39; Lubove, The Professional Altruist, p. 172.
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programmes, and in influencing public opinion through journals, confer-
ences, and public speaking. In these functions they mediated among
social agencies, business leaders, religious communities, women’s organiz-
ations, and politicians. They had extensive social networks and were par-
ticularly influential spokespersons in policy circles within the social
welfare field and in related political and community forums.
E. J. Urwick’s capacity to hold positions in social welfare planning,
social work education, and the organization of social research reflected
his professional trajectory. He was a member of the budgeting committee
of the FCS and the Child Welfare Council, and, as head of the Department
of Social Science at the University of Toronto (1928–1937), he had con-
siderable influence over the direction of social work training. Edward
Johns Urwick (1867–1945) had come to Toronto from London in 1927
for health reasons and moved on to Vancouver in 1940.50 In London,
Urwick had been involved in several COS District Committees, was the
original director of the London School of Sociology and Social
Economics, which inaugurated a new period of “academic openness”
toward the COS tenets, and negotiated its absorption into the London
School of Economics, where he continued as its head.51 Urwick brought
to the problems of organization of social welfare an appreciation for scien-
tific philanthropy and a respect for the role of service in clients’ lives.
However, he also expressed an awareness of the potential for service to
create a class-mediating disposition among political leaders.52
The work of the Bruce committee drew upon the experience of
Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and non-denominational organizations, and
those connections were represented by leaders in the housing campaign.53
50 Wills, A Marriage of Convenience, pp. 44, 46–47, 57, 63–64; Harold A. Innis, “Obituaries: Edward
Johns Urwick, 1867–1945,” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, vol. 11, no. 2 (May
1945), p. 265.
51 Jose´ Harris, “The Webbs, The Charity Organisation Society and the Ratan Tata Foundation: Social
Policy from the Perspective of 1912” in Martin Bulmer, Jane Lewis, and David Piachaud, eds., The
Goals of Social Policy (London and Boston: Unwin and Hyman, 1989), pp. 34–35, 40–41. The
Charity Organisation Society (COS) was established in London in the 1870s to bring order to the
unwieldy collection of organizations providing charity without consideration of the patterns of
dependence that threatened to arise. The COS instituted “scientific” investigation of needs and
the mobilization of social influences to set a path for reform in the behaviour of clients. District
offices coordinated the work of charities in particular neighbourhoods, while the Central Office
collected information and pursued donors for the particular cases (Woodroofe, From Charity to
Social Work, pp. 25–55).
52 Harris, “Social Policy from the Perspective of 1912,” p. 50. Jose´ Harris notes that the “purpose of the
practical work [involving observation of coordinating organizations and state institutions] was
imaginative expansion of citizenship rather than vocational training” (p. 35).
53 The full list of organizations that assisted the Bruce Committee was as follows: Big Sister
Association, Big Brother Movement Incorporated, Board of Education of the City of Toronto,
Catholic Welfare Bureau, Central Neighborhood House, Children’s Aid Society of Toronto,
Federation of Jewish Philanthropies, Jewish Big Brother Movement, Jewish Big Sister Movement,
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Urwick’s mediating position between business representatives and social
workers contrasts with the roles of the religious community spokespersons,
Rabbi Maurice Eisendrath and Canon H. P. Plumptre. Within their
respective traditions, each of these men pressed their congregations
to accept an ethical imperative to confront poverty and deprivation
politically. The ideological commitments of these two leaders placed a
particular value on coordinated service to underprivileged downtown
communities.54
The considerable involvement of Jewish social agencies in the Bruce
committee’s investigation and the close connections between Eisendrath
and those involved in (predominantly) Christian organizations reflected
the rabbi’s perspective but, more importantly, the institutional orientation
of the established community of Western and Central European Jews in
Toronto. The Federation of Jewish Philanthropies (established in 1916)
shared a commitment to “scientific charity” with the FCS, although its
practices extended only to united fundraising and coordination, not
social planning, during the interwar period. Many children of the
members of the synagogues responsible for establishing the FJP (Goel
Tzedec and Holy Blossom) trained at the School of Social Science
during the 1920s, had formative contact with the leaders of the NWA,
and carried their learning into the reform of Jewish charitable work.55
The combined credibility these leaders achieved by speaking as planners
of social welfare activity, coordinators of social research, and authorities
on responsible community action distinguished their political position.
Such a claim to influence social policy was shared by an organization
with which Urwick and Plumptre both had contact and which was mobi-
lized in support of the slum clearance campaign, the SSCC.56 Although
the SSCC was withdrawing from its social research and policy develop-
ment function during the 1930s, Rev. Claris Silcox, who directed its rea-
lignment, nevertheless publicly supported Urwick’s initiatives. Silcox was
Jewish Family Welfare Bureau, Neighborhood Workers Association, Poppy Fund, Social Service
Department of the General Hospital, St. Christopher House, St. Elizabeth Visiting Nurses’
Association, University Settlement, Toronto Housing Company, Ltd., Victorian Order of Nurses,
Visiting Housekeepers Association (Bruce Report, p. 9).
54 Maurice Eisendrath, The Never Failing Stream (Toronto: MacMillan, 1939), pp. 137–142; Stephen
A. Speisman, The Jews of Toronto: A History to 1937 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1979),
pp. 216–217; Canon H. P. Plumptre, “Christianity’s Great Asset,” Canadian Churchman, vol. 62,
no. 37 (October 10, 1935), and “The Evolution of the Social Conscience, Part III: During the
Nineteenth Century and Onwards,” Canadian Churchman, vol. 64, no. 24 (June 10, 1937), p. 359;
Mail, September 18, 1935. Eisendrath had come from the United States in 1927 to become the
rabbi at Holy Blossom Synagogue and remained until 1943. Henry Pemberton Plumptre was the
rector at St. James Cathedral between 1909 and 1935.
55 Jack Edwin Lipinsky, “The Progressive Wedge: The Organizational Behaviour of Toronto Jewry,
1933–1948” (PhD dissertation, University of Toronto, 2003), pp. 37, 46–49, 170–171.
56 Christie and Gauvreau, A Full-Orbed Christianity, pp. 213–214; Toronto Daily Star, April 9, 1952.
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the campaign’s “leading publicist” as editor of Social Welfare and oversaw
the publication of pamphlets relating to slum clearance. Beneath the
surface there were tensions. Where Urwick pressed for an expansion
and defence of Christian service through non-partisan representation to
committees setting policy for the state or guiding research, Silcox feared
that the outcome of competition among rival voices for social reform
might result in a loss of community influence for the churches.57
Social issues were not compartmentalized in this era, and the leaders of
the housing campaign shared other projects at the time. Silcox and
Lieutenant Governor Herbert Bruce were associated with Eisendrath’s
initiatives in Jewish-Gentile relations in the context of the rising anti-semit-
ism of the 1930s.58 These overlapping networks likely contributed to their
capacity to leverage influence by building a multifaceted group.
Alongside and interconnected with these men with prominent insti-
tutional and symbolic authority were networks of women leaders, active
in social welfare and social policy discussions that were important to
social welfare. The Toronto Local Council of Women contributed to the
membership of the Bruce committee and provided volunteer investigators
for its surveys. Rosa Brown Eisendrath, whose husband was the rabbi of
Holy Blossom Synagogue, was active in the Housing Centre while being
the convener of the LCW’s Housing and Town Planning Committee
(1935–1937). The outstanding political representative of the campaign
was Adelaide Plumptre (wife of Canon Plumptre). Plumptre had been
educated at Oxford and distinguished herself in the social welfare field
by helping direct the Canadian Red Cross Society into becoming a
public health service and an agency for hygiene and nutrition education,
setting the course for its work in unemployment relief and hostels
during the Depression. She acted as a political guide to the Council of
Women and initiated policy proposals in the Toronto Anglican Diocesan
Council for Social Service.59
57 Carver, Compassionate Landscape, p. 53; Christie and Gauvreau, A Full-Orbed Christianity, pp. 221–
223, p. 221 n. 120. Carver appears to have been present for many of the Housing Centre’s meetings
and gives a sense of the relationships involved in the campaign, though he was not sensitive to the
particular positions of all the members. On Urwick’s capacity to manage these relationships, see
Compassionate Landscape, pp. 53–54.
58 Bruce, Varied Operations, pp. 238–239.
59 Bruce Report, pp. 3, 9; Archives of Ontario, F805 Box 4, “Report,” p. 37; Carver, Compassionate
Landscape, p. 53; Vivien R. Kerr, A Flame of Compassion: A History of the Provincial Council of
Women of Ontario ([Toronto]: Provincial Council of Women of Ontario and T. H. Best Printing
Co. Ltd., 1967), pp. 18–19; Edward Pulker, We Stand on their Shoulders: The Growth of Social
Concern in Canadian Anglicanism (Toronto: Anglican Book Centre, 1986), p. 118; E. H. A.
Watson, History: Ontario Red Cross, 1914–1946 (Toronto: Ontario Division Headquarters of the
Canadian Red Cross Society, [1946]), pp. 9–23; Sarah C. Glassford, Marching as to War: The
Canadian Red Cross Society, 1885–1939 (PhD dissertation, York University, 2007), p. 386;
Toronto Daily Star, January 2, 1936.
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Plumptre’s disposition in municipal politics was rooted in her thorough
experience of Christian social service, while her interest in political office
coincided with the Council of Women’s commitment to non-partisan con-
tributions to humanizing and cleaning up politics. After serving on the
Toronto Board of Education (1926–1934), she was elected to council as
the representative for Ward 2 (containing the Moss Park neighbourhood)
in 1936 and served until 1940. The Local Council of Women appears to
have been an important supporter of Plumptre, through her successes
and failures, and was an audience for her concerns about the obstacles
to women’s participation in politics.60
The power of these leaders in the social welfare field was both specific to
the field and constitutive of linkages that extended beyond it. Sharing a
practical disposition and discourse of service with a diverse group of
actors allowed the leaders to project their influence into emergent fields
of struggle over state powers at the municipal level.
Neighbourhood Life and Redevelopment Plans
The construction of the slum problem involved the regionalization of
neighbourhoods according to social welfare practices that were themselves
configured by the social patterns that social agencies encountered. An
original anchoring of the slum population to the inner city was taken for
granted by the social welfare approach. The pressure for inner-city low-
rental housing reflected residents’ dependence on proximity to formal
employment and odd jobs for men and women and, particularly among
“the foreign element,” a commitment to the space: “they became part
and parcel of a particular neighbourhood and they do not want to leave
it.”61 The interactions of social service workers and residents, as well as
the networking of social workers, contributed to an understanding of
bad housing as related to the social problems that characterized the dis-
trict. While social welfare workers were committed to improving living
conditions in the neighbourhoods where they worked without relocation
of the groups rooted there, the task of delineating the geographic lines
of redevelopment was given over to a group of architects. This alliance
could be expected to strengthen the position of the social welfare leader-
ship in relation to the established authority of city planners.
60 Veronica Strong-Boag, The Parliament of Women: The National Council of Women in Canada, 1893–
1929 (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1976), pp. 382–385. Plumptre announced that she
would run for the Board of Control before a supportive gathering of the Local Council of
Women in 1940 (The Globe, December18, 1940). From an isolated account of Plumptre, it
appears that her fellow councillors regularly depreciated her contribution even when they
accepted its direction (CTA, Adelaide Plumptre Fonds, SC1349, Box 11, File 11, Mrs. H. P.
Plumptre to Miss Ross, June 8, 1938).
61 House of Commons, Special Committee on Housing, “Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence,” No. 5
(March 14, 1935), pp. 146–147.
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The architects contributed a block-by-block study of housing and land
use and made proposals for redevelopment. The intensive survey of
Moss Park and the Ward detailed the sensorial intrusions on residential
life generated by the presence of industrial buildings and traffic, the
absence of vegetation, and presence of dirt and waste. They characterized
the neighbourhoods as consisting “of crowded houses in uncongenial sur-
roundings,” lacking in playgrounds, homes of style or good construction,
and opportunities for the enjoyment of tranquillity. The architects selected
“a representative block” for reconstruction on the basis of the state of
housing, the absence of pressure for industrial use (low assessments),
and the beneficial proximity of employment for workers.62
The cooperation of architects offered a measure of professional recog-
nition for the social welfare leaders, but also made them captive to the
architects’ proposals and assessments of their leadership. The architects
were part of a new generation interested in community planning. They
shared a critique of planning practice and a demand that it be carried
out in the “public interest” rather than with exclusive concern for trans-
portation and service infrastructure or for subdivisions promoted by real
estate interests. Rebuilding on a relatively modest scale, as discussed
in the Bruce Report, was in contrast to the community planning vision
of the architects, but it acknowledged social welfare claims of how inte-
grated neighbourhood life was. The compromise was in the nature of a
bargain because the neighbourhood analysis provided by inner-city
social service workers was precisely the exemplar for their programme
of organizing housing as “neighbourhood units” with a full slate of
modern amenities. This concept was reflected in microcosm in the
Bruce Report’s redevelopment plans. While the architects gave a particu-
lar form to neighbourhood evaluation and to the call for rebuilding, they
also supported the introduction of social service priorities into those
housing plans.63
A year after the release of the Bruce Report, members of the committee
had begun to ask whether they had weakened their “case by allowing
62 Bruce Report, pp. 22–23, 25–31, 94.
63 Ibid., p. 118; House of Commons, Special Committee on Housing, “Minutes of Proceedings and
Evidence,” p. 144; Eric Arthur, “Housing and Town Planning” in C. A. Ashley, ed.,
Reconstruction in Canada: Lectures given in the University of Toronto (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1942), pp. 122–124; Humphrey Carver, “Utopia and City Hall,” Canadian Forum,
vol. 15 (February 1936), “International Housing,” Canadian Forum, vol. 16, (April 1936), pp. 20–
21; and “New Towns for Old,” Canadian Forum, vol. 16 (January 1937), pp. 16–17; The Research
Committee of the League for Social Reconstruction, Social Planning for Canada (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press 1975 [1935]), pp. 452, 458, 460–462. “Chapter XIX: A Housing
Programme” is recognized as the work of Humphrey Carver, who was directly involved in the
housing campaign, but not in production of the Bruce Report (Carver, Compassionate Landscape,
p. 51).
102 Histoire sociale / Social History
the architects to draw up elaborate proposals for reconstruction which
however good they may have been distracted attention from the main
point of the report.”64 In reviewing the wisdom of “segregating one or
two special districts and concentrating attention upon the rather exclusive,
particularly in the matter of alterations,” the committee revealed its
concern that meticulous re-planning not jeopardize the inauguration of a
long-term political programme to improve housing.65
Political Strategy and Mobilization
The case made by the Bruce Report was answered soon after its release in
November 1934 with endorsements from the Toronto business community,
religious leaders, and political organizations. These included qualified
support from the Toronto Board of Trade, but outright commitment
from the National Council of Women and the Anglican Synod.66 These
endorsements reflected the political pressure exerted by the social
welfare leadership through its existing relationships.
The political strategy of the social welfare leadership delineated particu-
lar spheres of mobilization and sources of support. On the one hand, orga-
nizing work was directed toward the social welfare field. On the other, the
discourse and publicity were intended to shape public opinion among the
politically active.67 Further, the campaign attempted to achieve a balance
between the assertion of civic responsibility (arising from the social
welfare concern for family life) and the assertion of a federal obligation
(on the basis of its fiscal capacity, welfare interest, and the national econ-
omic origins of the housing shortage).
The housing campaign reflected the political strategies nurtured by the
historical relationship between business and social work in Toronto.
Gradualist (and non-partisan) politics through influencing public opinion
was the rule during the interwar period.68 Locally, the call for public
support was accomplished discursively through an appeal to civic respon-
sibility and to an accepted system of norms about the fitness of a dwelling
for Anglo-American, middle-class homes. These norms were embodied in
the problematization of low-income housing. The radical potential of the
report’s recommendations was limited by its distinction between the
slum problem and the need for inducements to the private building indus-
try. The housing campaign questioned citizens’ sense of attachment to
64 University of Toronto Archives [hereafter UTA], Department of Political Economy [hereafter DPE],
A76–0025, Box 1, File 5, E. J. Urwick to Dr. Leo A. Haak, October 18, 1935.
65 Ibid.
66 The Globe, January 21, 28, and 30, 1935; May 17, 1935; June 12, 1935.
67 E. J. Urwick, The Social Good (London: Methuen, 1927), pp. 123, 125, 195.
68 Stapleford, After Twenty Years, p. 18; Wills, A Marriage of Convenience, pp. 71–73, 80–82, 89–95.
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place and community, as well as their declarations of concern for the
welfare of their neighbours.69
Mobilizing support for the report’s recommendations was pursued initially
by Bruce and Urwick, then formalized through the Toronto Housing Centre,
established in September 1936. From the spring of 1935 and into 1936, meet-
ings were held with visiting dignitaries and politicians at Government House,
and addresses were made to political, religious, and educational associations,
as well as to the House of Commons Special Committee on Housing. The
Housing Centre was organized to influence public opinion and undertook
this task through meetings, publications, and radio broadcasts. It scraped by
financially on donations from a few wealthy benefactors. The University of
Toronto loaned the premises at 86 Queen’s Park as office space. The most
elaborate event organized by the Housing Centre was an exhibition that ran
from April 24 to May 19, 1937. Bruce opened the exhibition, which included
the reproduction of a slum room and featured weekly speakers from Toronto,
elsewhere in Canada, and abroad.70
The Housing Centre deployed existing social work and charity net-
works. In its campaigns it identified social service leaders and business
elites as potential members of a propaganda committee, although a list
drawn up by Urwick also included an architect, as well as representatives
from labour and the CCF. Urwick spoke to the Canadian Youth Council
Forum on “Slum Clearance” in 1936 and encouraged members to
devote themselves however they could to “this great cause.” A meeting
of the Toronto Association of Social Workers held on January 20, 1937,
attracted about 60 members who were “most anxious to discuss the
whole situation with a view to any contributions they may give as social
workers.”71 Later the same month, the Housing Centre contacted 30 or
69 Bruce Report, p. 15, 32–33, 112, 117; Herbert A. Bruce, Friendship: The Key to Peace and Other
Addresses (Toronto: Macmillan, 1937), pp. 14, 19; E. J. Urwick, “Housing and Social Work,”
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40 social agencies offering to arrange meetings to discuss housing needs in
Toronto. By mid-February it had moved to approaching churches. Other
efforts to place the question before members of the social welfare field
included a session of the Canadian Conference on Social Work on the
“Low-Rent Housing Problem” in June and an associated issue of Social
Welfare that reproduced some of the conference papers.72
Political Struggle
The social welfare construction of the slum problem carried within it a
class-specific imperative for action, but also supported the political claim
of its authors that the problem could only be adequately addressed by
“disinterested leadership.” The model of governance had to fit the charac-
ter of the problem. In seeking public action under the influence of the
voluntary sector, the Toronto housing campaign resonates with debates
then underway in Britain. There, a voluntary housing sector affiliated
with social services vied unsuccessfully for exclusive position as managers
in new slum clearance works enabled by the 1930 Housing Act.73 In
Toronto, the coherence and authority of the movement led by social
welfare was tested through investigatory and advisory committees and a
municipal plebiscite on slum clearance.
The Attempt to Secure Institutional Authority
The housing campaign attempted to specify the requisite disposition for
those who would direct the new state powers relating to low-income
housing. The Bruce Report made its priority clear: institutional authority
should only be conferred upon leaders moved by ethical service and pos-
sessing well-developed judgement in social matters. The Bruce Report
endorsed the appointment of an investigatory and advisory City
Planning Commission composed of volunteers who were “competent, dis-
interested, and independent” citizens. Various formulas for dividing or
72 UTA, DPE, A65–0005, Box 1, File 6, E. J. Urwick to Mrs. Lewis Samuel, January 23, 1937;
E. J. Urwick to Helen Spence, February 16, 1937; E. J. Urwick to George S. Mooney, May 19,
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June 21, 1937.
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in the Post-1832 United Kingdom (Lewiston/ Queenston/ Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press),
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combining the work of a city planning commission and a housing board were
proposed, but, throughout the period, until city council had decided the issue
for the immediate future, the social welfare leadership asserted the need for
a “representative citizen’s committee.” This was sometimes defined nega-
tively as a committee free of experts in related professions (real estate, con-
tractors, architects) or municipal officials. Urwick proposed a membership
list to Bruce in early February 1935: the mayor, a representative from city
council, J. J. Gibson, J. M. MacDonnell, William Dunn (all three having
been members of the Bruce Committee), Rabbi Eisendrath, and a “repre-
sentative of the social services of the city who is interested in housing and
planning, preferably a woman. (We would suggest either Miss Margaret
Gould or Miss Oliver Ziegler).”74 As envisioned by Urwick, the
Commission would draw together representatives of business, social
agencies, and religious life who were distinguished by their experience of
service to inner-city, lower-class populations — in other words, precisely
those who shared a perception formed by such service.
In March 1936 Mayor Stewart established a “Special Committee re
Housing” to confer with the federal government about the possibility of
a housing scheme as a relief project and to gather information relevant
to the problem of low-cost housing from municipal departments and inter-
ested groups of “taxpayers.” A struggle ensued over the organizational
status and representation of a housing commission with powers to rec-
ommend action.75 Both Plumptre and Urwick privately expressed
concern that “influential groups,” particularly the Development
Recovery Committee, might influence the appointment of a commission
that would serve the aims of businessmen and parties with a material
stake or sole interest in reducing unemployment. Several religious
leaders (Eisendrath, Silcox, and M. J. McGrath of the Catholic
Adjustment Bureau) involved in the campaign expressed a similar
concern in a submission to the Board of Control. They advocated a com-
mission whose membership included only those “whose interest is primar-
ily in the welfare of the city and its people rather than in any particular
financial or business reward,” though that could include certain heads of
city departments.76
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This struggle clearly involved a rivalry between groups sharing an inter-
est in the development of new state powers. The Development Recovery
Committee, which appeared in the spring of 1936, was a “a group of
some forty men, prominent in various callings . . . actively engaged in evol-
ving programs to relieve the unemployment situation in and around the
City.” In June 1936, L. M. Wood of the organization’s Subcommittee on
Housing estimated that the time had arrived for the DRC “to mobilize
its forces of talents and influence and show leadership.” A report of the
subcommittee accepted by the DRC recommended that the commission
to deal with the housing problem should include four individuals
“versed respectively in Finance, Law [later replaced by “Labor”], Real
Estate, and Building.” That Lieutenant-Colonel F. H. Marani (an archi-
tect) and David Shephard (an engineer) were involved in both the DRC
and the Housing Centre indicates the extent to which the rivalry
between the groups revolved around which leaders would be institution-
ally recognized as significant in the movement for slum clearance.77
The proposal that city planning be made subject to the judgement of
“disinterested” civic leaders was greeted with incredulity by the city’s
established authorities. The City Planning Commissioner, Tracy leMay,
was of the opinion that planning had been restrained not by lack of
plans or a single authority but because of inadequate public support.
Rather than a commission of private citizens organized to develop new
plans, as advocated in the Bruce Report, he suggested, “it would therefore
appear to be a proper function of a commission of private citizens to
educate public opinion to the point where it authorizes Council to spend
sufficient money to carry out some of the existing plans.”78
Clearly, the municipal state was under great scrutiny because of the
intervention of social welfare leaders. Civic authorities expressed strong
reservations about the report and its recommendations. The department
heads sought to diminish the credibility of the social welfare leadership in
the political field and proposed institutional adjustments that would allow
city departments to redirect the pressure along a path consistent with their
regulatory work. Immediately after release of the report, le May attributed
slum conditions largely to the habits of tenants and defended the need for
“buffer strips” where dwellings would be permitted to depreciate in
quality, as these tracts would protect property values in the core residential
areas from trends in commercial and industrial land use. When called upon
77 Library and Archives Canada, Department of Labour Papers, RG 27, vol. 3356, file 6, The
Development Recovery Committee [DRC] – A. D. Clarke, Secretary to Unnamed Recipient,
Toronto, June 19, 1936; DRC – Minutes of the Executive Committee Meeting, June 8, 1936;
DRC – Report on Canadian Housing by Sub-Committee on Housing – submitted to the General
Committee by L. M. Wood, March 27, 1936.
78 CTA, CTPB Fonds, 2032, S721, File 2, “Memorandum respecting the Report of the Lieut-Governor’s
[sic] Committee on Housing conditions in Toronto,” n.d.
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for guidance in establishing the necessary powers to close or rehabilitate
houses as a stop-gap measure, the heads of the departments of Public
Health, Buildings, Public Welfare, and Planning made recommendations
for a housing standard by-law (14466), enacted in the spring of 1936.
Despite earlier admissions on the part of the Medical Officer of Health
that the strict enforcement of by-laws would displace residents and leave
them with few housing options, they endorsed the inspection process as an
adequate response to the slum problem tout court. Challenging the Bruce
Report’s conception of the problem proved administratively feasible, but
by the summer of 1938 the department heads’ commitment to code enforce-
ment, based on their representation of the housing problem in terms of
blight, had become politically unpalatable.79
The architects who collaborated with the Bruce Committee and the
Housing Centre envisioned the role of the social welfare leadership as pol-
itical organizers, not as members of planning commissions. In this they
expressed a professional commitment. In a letter to leMay, Humphrey
Carver characterized “the two essential parties to the movement . . . [as]
those doing amateur propaganda work (the Housing Centre people
etc.,) and those like yourself who are in the thing in an official capacity,
whether they want to be in it or not.”80 The unarticulated, mediating pos-
ition of the new generation of architects illustrates how their alliance with
the social welfare leadership was part of a strategy to restructure the plan-
ning field. The stakes of the struggle were twofold: the autonomy of the
planning field, and the structure of the field itself.
The attempt of social welfare leaders to establish a commission that would
be an autonomous and representative citizens’ body was frustrated by the
actions of the Board of Control. The controllers and the mayor rejected
the need for more citizen representation and, rather than considering the
Special Committee’s recommendation to this effect, they recommended
that council create an Advisory Committee subordinate to the Board of
Control. Members of the Special Committee regarded this action as reckless
as it was contrary to the suggested conditions for federal support that seemed
79 CTA, CTPB Fonds, 2032, S721, File 2, Memo for Controller Wadsworth, n.d.; CTA, MMT, 220, S100,
File 8, G. P. Jackson, K. S. Gillies, Tracy D. leMay, C. M. Colquhoun to the Mayor and members of the
Board of Control, February 26, 1935; Urwick to House of Commons, Special Committee on Housing,
“Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence,” p. 152; CTA, MMT, 220, S100, File 8, Med Officer of
Health, Commissioners of Buildings, Public Welfare, Finance, Assessment, and City Planning and
City Solicitor to Mrs. Alderman Plumptre (Chairman), and Members of Special Committee re
Housing, City Hall, April 14, 1936; Toronto Daily Star, May 4, 1938; CTA, Former City of
Toronto [hereafter FCT] Fonds, 200, S1078, City Council Minutes, January 29, 1935, CTA, FCT
Fonds, 200, S779, File 71, Board of Control Minute Book, February 5, 1935, and File 77, Board of
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to be emerging through the (ultimately unrealized) plans of the National
Employment Commission. Councillors McNish and Plumptre did succeed
in increasing the representation of citizens on the Advisory Committee
from three to five (with three city commissioners). Plumptre’s attempt to
have Urwick appointed along with F. D. Tolchard of the Board of Trade
was less successful, for only the latter was admitted in late October, along
with L. M. Wood and Lieutenant-Colonel F. H. Marani (of the DRC),
Mr. E. W. Sinfield (of the Trades and Labour Congress), and Mrs. J. W.
Bundy (the long-time convener of the Housing and Town Planning commit-
tee of the LCW) as the citizen representatives. The commissioners of public
welfare, property, and planning completed membership of the Advisory
Committee, constituted as a successor to the Special Committee with
powers to recommend policy to council.81
Getting the Ball Rolling
Without the immediate prospect of institutional authority, the Housing
Centre focused on influencing the new Advisory Committee and shaping
public pressure on city council. Achieving political action on the slum
problem as defined by the Bruce Report was the basic test of the campaign
and of the representation of the social welfare leaders.
As municipal action appeared more likely, social welfare leaders became
increasingly pragmatic. The Housing Centre showed itself open to a broad
coalition among parties interested in housing: “Social Agencies, Women’s
organizations, Churches, C.C.F., Trades’ Council, Unemployed Councils,
Youth Council, etc.”82 The Housing Centre resolved that the necessity
for planning should be deferred and not hold up action.83 Most impor-
tantly, it established its influence over the Advisory Committee, which
came to rely upon the Housing Centre for information, persuasion of a
defiant member (Sinfield, who worried wages might fall if rents were sub-
sidized), and the exertion of public pressure upon city council.84
The lobbying and committee work culminated in city council’s decision
to hold a plebiscite for ratepayers on whether the city should be author-
ized to pursue a demolition and building programme in an as yet unar-
ranged deal with upper levels of government. The adoption of the bill
81 Bacher, “One Unit Was Too Many,” pp. 54–55; The Globe, December 19, 1934, and August 6, 1935;
CTA, RG 200, Special Committee Minutes, A, Box 1, “Special Committee Re Housing,” May 29,
August 18, October 2, October 7, and October 14, 1936; CTA, FCT Fonds, 200, S1078, 1936 City
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B. Publicity Program,” n.d.
83 CTA, CTPB Fonds, 2032, S721, File 4, Minutes of meeting, May 19, 1937.
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was rushed through on November 1 and 2, 1937. Controller Day initiated
the proceedings, and Aldermen Bray and Smith made an unsuccessful
attempt to expand eligibility from those authorized to vote on money
matters to all who could vote for mayor. However, there was reason to
worry that haste would now compromise the initiative through careless
preparation. Alderman Plumptre expressed fears that the plebiscite
might make or break the gamble on the slum clearance campaign.85
Once the plebiscite bill was adopted, the proposal itself became the
focal point for the slum clearance campaign. The Housing Centre redir-
ected its attention accordingly, hosting a meeting of the “Campaign
Committee to Secure a Favourable Vote on the Housing Bylaw” on
November 24. Tactics for distributing literature and developing counter-
arguments to opposition were on the agenda. Canon Plumptre had the
task of obtaining press coverage. Radio time was donated by the
Community Welfare Council, and coverage was promised in at least one
radio sermon. Organizers were encouraged to purchase time where
possible.86
Opponents to the municipal proposal appeared quickly from a variety of
positions. The Property Owners Association of Toronto recommended
rejecting it outright, expressing concern about its unspecified terms, the
threat of a further tax on already overburdened property owners, and
damage to real estate as a form of investment.87 Some groups that
offered support for slum clearance and rehousing in principle objected
that the proposal overlooked the necessity of city planning in advance of
such a project or failed to provide adequate detail. The Bureau of
Municipal Research argued that the adoption of a housing programme
was premature on these grounds. The General Manager and President
of the Toronto Board of Trade decided to delay advising members on
how to vote until city council had responded to its request to issue a state-
ment of clarification related to the plebiscite question that would identify
the plans and provisions for “proper safeguards.” No such statement was
issued by City Council.88
The Globe and Mail speculated that the higher than usual number of
votes cast on December 6 was in part attributable to the housing plebiscite.
The day after the vote, the newspaper forecast that the decision would be
85 CTA, FCT Fonds, 200, S1078, City Council Minutes, November 1 and 2, 1937; The Globe and Mail,
August 5 and November 3, 1937.
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overwhelmingly against the proposal, and it was. With 36,687 votes against
and only 13,789 in favour, it was clear that opposition had solidified.89 The
“Yes” vote’s proportion of the total varied from 22 per cent at its lowest
(in Ward 3) to above 30 per cent in only two areas, Ward 4 (39 per
cent) and Ward 5 (32 per cent).90
The plebiscite was a test of the movement for slum clearance, but not its
death-knell. The defection of the Board of Trade from full support was
tempered by a commitment to “a proper housing and slum clearance
plan.” The Housing Centre, for its part, recognized that the issue of
finance and sensitivity to citizens’ capacity to pay was critical.
Nevertheless, members argued that finance should not be an insurmounta-
ble problem in a country as wealthy as Canada. The removal of municipal
personal income tax powers in exchange for a grant to municipalities in
1936 and the unrealized city proposal (in 1933) to make income taxes
more progressive reveal how politically malleable taxation was perceived
as being in the 1930s.91
Both before the plebiscite and after, the Housing Centre presented the
case for slum clearance with urgency. In the summer of 1937, Urwick
expressed fears that the forces of delay would extinguish “impulses toward
right action.”92 Immediate action, not more research, plans, and commis-
sions, was required, he argued. Urwick implored his audience to recognize
that difficulties and doubts were normal. “Meet your perplexities with talk
and they will perplex you still more,” he advised. “Meet them with action,
and they will tend to melt away. If rehousing is begun within the next
twelve months, there is hope of some achievement. If it is postponed
beyond that limit, we may as well abandon hope for another twelve
years.”93 In the wake of the failed plebiscite, the necessity of starting some-
where was reiterated by reference to the successful British experience in
developing a growing “housing consciousness” among the public that led
to the English slum clearance legislation of 1935.94
The perception that immediate action was necessary had two inter-
twined sources. One reflected the construction of the problem itself, the
89 The Globe and Mail, December 7 and 17, 1937.
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manifest potential for improvement in living conditions among the disad-
vantaged and the credibility of civic responsibility. The other aspect
reflected the stakes of the campaign. The spokesperson for any new
project must gauge the practicality of targets for action and call actors to
face a new dimension of service. The truth of a political proposition lies
in the capacity of the speaker to mobilize sufficient forces for its realiz-
ation.95 The social welfare leadership had staked its political credit on
the campaign. Urwick had sought to realize his view that social work
ought to act not simply to improve the lot of the poor, but also as “a
wider instrument of class integration in which the social worker must func-
tion as a more general ‘servant of society’.”96 The commitment to reprodu-
cing this position and role was reflected in the training for social workers at
the University of Toronto, which was meant to prepare leaders to act as
part of a professional class of men, distinguishable from (generally
female) case workers with specific technical skills. As Shirley Tillotson
has argued in her study of charitable fundraising, the gender divisions
that were promoted in this period were interconnected with political rival-
ries. Urwick was seeking institutional means of educating and involving
leaders in social service (much along the lines that many elite women
gained and practised in the emergent period of the social welfare field)
who would be successful in struggles with representatives of business, par-
tisan, and professional interests both within the social welfare field and in
emerging spheres of state influence.97 In the postwar period, precisely this
form of paternalistic political representation became improbable as the
meaning of “citizen participation” and “charity” changed and as labour
unions became influential contributors to community chests.98
Conclusion
The main actors responsible for producing the Bruce Report and under-
taking the campaign for slum clearance drew upon resources specific to
the social welfare field to construct the “slum” problem in Toronto, yet
endeavoured to extend their influence in relation to municipal politics
by mobilizing allies and activating a sense of duty among citizens. They
achieved neither the institutional authority they had sought nor action
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along the lines they had proposed. Nevertheless, the intervention had
several lasting effects. First, the campaign helped to mobilize a wider
movement for national housing and planning reform whose leadership
passed to a new generation of planners, architects, and municipal organi-
zers. Expectations about which level of government should initiate such
policy shifted from municipal to federal in the late 1930s, and this persisted
through the Second World War. While the federal government initiated
support for low-cost housing through the National Housing Act of 1938,
it failed to gain political support in Toronto. Indeed, it was found to be
unmanageable across the country.99
Nevertheless, organizing moved beyond civic mobilization to provincial,
and especially national, activity through a series of conferences and the
formation of the National Housing and Planning Association beginning
in the spring of 1937. Community planning proponents such as Eric
Arthur and Humphrey Carver, as well as G. S. Mooney, the advocate for
municipal governments, became its principal directors. These actors con-
tributed much to national research and policy activity as exemplified by
the report of the Sub-Committee on Housing and Community Planning
to the Advisory Committee on Reconstruction (1944).100 Secondly, the pol-
itical campaign led established authorities to make administrative adjust-
ments. The 1936 Housing By-law was one example, and another came in
the planning field. Municipal pressure for an institutionalized planning
body persisted. The neighbourhood evaluations of the Bruce Committee
were confirmed by the City Planning Board’s 1943 Master Plan.101
Finally, the social welfare leadership’s activities organized around the
Housing Centre at 86 Queen’s Park wound down in the early fall of
1939.102 That campaign ceded the place of “citizens’ representative” to
the Citizens’ Housing and Planning Association (CHPA, established in
1944). The intervention led by social welfare gave an initial structure to
the local political field in the matter of low-income housing and slum clear-
ance. It established organizational connections that were subsequently
expressed through the formation of a Housing Committee to the
99 Bacher, Keeping to the Marketplace, p. 108. For civic authorities’ negative evaluation of the NHA
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Toronto Reconstruction Council (established in 1943). Similarly, the
mobilization of social agency, philanthropic, and church groups during
the 1930s must in part explain how rapidly the membership of the
CHPA grew. The organizational efforts of the 1930s conditioned those
of the wartime and postwar periods, but the early positions were also
subject to revision as new forms of political representation took root
and as the social welfare field upon which the leaders of the 1930s
depended changed. During the 1930s, a first round of the game was
played as initial positions in a struggle over new state powers were
defined.103
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